BRICS 2026: Why Bangladesh's "absence" may matter more than we think
India Today's OSINT team audited and mapped India's options to reach its Northeast - nearly three out of four routes run through Bangladesh.
“No confirmation from Dhaka.” That was the MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal's response when asked whether Bangladesh PM Tarique Rahman would attend the BRICS Summit in India, despite an earlier formal invitation.
It is another sign of uncertainty in ties with a neighbour once seen as one of India’s closest regional partners.
On August 18, New Delhi publicly put forth its expectations from Dhaka. The MEA said it wanted “positive, constructive, and forward-looking relations with Bangladesh based on mutuality of interest and reciprocity.” That marks a departure from the Gujral doctrine of 1996, when then Prime Minister IK Gujral said, “We do not ask for reciprocity, but give and accommodate what we can in good faith and trust.”
But India’s changing approach to Dhaka runs into an old geographical reality: its own efforts to build alternatives to the Siliguri Corridor rely heavily on Bangladesh.
India has spent years building these routes. The paradox is that many of its alternatives to the Chicken’s Neck pass through Bangladeshi territory.
India Today’s Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) team mapped these connections using Parliament replies, Indian Railways documents and government records.
The mapping identifies 32 routes connecting mainland India with the Northeast: 23 through Bangladesh, seven entirely within India, and two via Nepal or Myanmar. Of these, 16 are operational, three are under work and 13 remain proposals.
Bangladesh is not just one route - it is a network
The seven India-only options comprise two road and five railway routes. The much larger Bangladesh basket contains two roads, four multimodal routes, eight port-transit routes and nine railway alignments.
A separate mapping of 14 Bangladesh-linked routes gives another layer to that picture. These cover India-backed connectivity, officially enabled transit arrangements and proposed rail links involving Chattogram, Mongla, Akhaura, Agartala and other gateways.
The distinction matters: the 32-route count measures the broader access network, while the 14-route layer tracks a more specific set of Bangladesh-linked corridors that India has enabled, backed or proposed.
Some are already carrying cargo. In March 2026, a Kolkata-Pandu shipment moved through the Indo-Bangladesh Protocol route. Eight Chattogram-Mongla routes have also been notified and “operationalised after trials”.
Others remain incomplete. The Bangladesh-side portion of the 6.78-km Akhaura-Agartala rail link remains unresolved, while nine Bangladesh-linked railway alignments are still at the Final Location Survey stage.
India has also financed connectivity inside Bangladesh precisely because it creates alternatives to the Siliguri route. The projects include railways, roads, river dredging and the Akhaura-Agartala link.
India’s own 2017 approval for the $4.5-billion third Line of Credit explicitly linked the financing to “improving connectivity between India and Bangladesh” and “enhancing accessibility to our North Eastern Region.”
But the money has not translated neatly into completed infrastructure. Bangladesh’s Economic Relations Division says only $1.489 billion of a $7.362-billion Indian LoC was disbursed over 13 years, while 25 of 40 projects remained incomplete.
In March 2025, the LoC portfolio itself was reduced from about $7.34 billion to $4.68 billion, with 11 projects dropped. A Bangladesh ERD official acknowledged: “Some were delayed because of our faults and some for their fault.”
Why China’s footprint should concern Dhaka
After taking oath, Tarique Rahman chose Beijing for his first diplomatic visit. That choice is significant: India Today found three critical nodes where India has a footprint and China is now expanding its presence.
At Mongla, India financed the Khulna-Mongla rail connection. China and Bangladesh have now agreed to “jointly advance” the port’s modernisation and expansion.
At Chattogram, India has access arrangements, while Beijing is pursuing a Chinese Economic and Industrial Zone. On the Teesta, China’s MFA said it had “agreed to support the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project” and accelerate feasibility work.
But there is a catch. China’s money has built infrastructure, but there have been consequences for countries that fell into this “debt trap.” The US-based Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) has flagged “opaque and problematic loan terms” and debt risks in Djibouti, Zambia and Kenya, while Sri Lanka’s Hambantota remains the most cited example of how Beijing’s financing can create long-term strategic complications. Now, the political leadership in Dhaka will have to decide whether it wants the money with “strings” attached to it.
Delhi is hardening the other side of the equation
India’s trade policy has already become more restrictive. New Delhi withdrew Bangladesh’s third-country transhipment facility in April 2025 and subsequently restricted several Bangladeshi goods from entering through land routes. Jute products and ropes faced further land-route restrictions.
At the security level, the shift is even more visible.
On August 21 this year, Home Minister Amit Shah formally laid out the government’s “triangular security grid” around the Siliguri Corridor spanning the strategic garrisons at Dhubri in Assam, Kishanganj in Bihar and Chopra in West Bengal, saying the government was making the strategically vital passage “impregnable”. The reported three-point architecture centres on Dhubri, Kishanganj and Chopra.
But the shift is not limited to security and trade. It is also visible in how India now frames its relationship with Dhaka.
Why India travelled to “reciprocity”
The shift from the Gujral doctrine to New Delhi’s explicit call for “reciprocity” did not happen overnight. The latest phase of friction began with Sheikh Hasina’s ouster in August 2024 and her subsequent stay in India.
Tensions only deepened from there. Anti-India sentiment gained ground in Bangladesh, Dhaka sought Hasina’s extradition, and strains spilled into trade and diplomacy.
In March 2025, during his visit to Beijing, Muhammad Yunus described India’s Northeast as “landlocked” and Bangladesh as its “only guardian of the ocean.”
India’s response hardened, with trade restrictions and a growing emphasis on mutuality in the relationship.
By August 18, 2026, New Delhi had made its position explicit, calling for ties with Dhaka based on “mutuality of interest and reciprocity.”
From Gujral’s “does not ask for reciprocity” to New Delhi’s explicit demand for it, the shift is significant.