Parliament panel flags 20-year artillery delay, says Army stuck with obsolete guns
The report said the ministry took two decades to procure and induct the new artillery gun system, leaving the Army with a major shortage of artillery guns, and recommended regular reviews of capability gaps to ensure the timely acquisition of critical military equipment.
The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament has pulled up the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for a two-decade delay in procuring new artillery guns, saying the prolonged process left the Army dependent on obsolete weapon systems with limited firepower and adversely impacted its operational preparedness.
In its 49th Report of the 18th Lok Sabha (2026-27), the PAC said the delay in replacing the Army's ageing artillery fleet created a "huge deficiency" in capabilities and underscored the need for structural reforms in defence procurement, indigenous manufacturing and project execution.
The committee noted that the Army procured the 155mm/39 calibre Bofors guns in 1986 under a transfer of technology agreement. However, after the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) was banned in 1989, efforts to procure higher-calibre artillery guns through global tenders in the 1990s failed because of delays in finalising operational requirements and poor vendor response.
It took the Ministry two decades to finalise the procurement and induction of the new artillery gun system, resulting in a huge deficiency in stock, the report said, recommending that the ministry's institute a mechanism for periodic review of capability gaps and timely acquisition of critical military equipment in line with evolving security threats.
The PAC also criticised delays in the indigenous Dhanush artillery gun programme, saying inadequate infrastructure, evolving production methodology and shortages of specialised technical expertise significantly slowed the project.
The committee said it was "not convinced" by the ministry's explanation that the delays were inevitable because such a gun system had never been produced indigenously.
It recommended that future defence projects be preceded by comprehensive assessments of domestic manufacturing capabilities and infrastructure requirements to avoid time and cost overruns.
The report also flagged the lack of expertise in ballistics, gun electronics and the integration of advanced sighting systems, saying these deficiencies should have been identified during the project's planning stage rather than after execution had begun.
To bridge these gaps, the PAC recommended introducing specialised defence manufacturing courses in IITs and other technical institutions while establishing a regular upskilling mechanism for personnel in Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs).
The committee observed that although the Dhanush project was monitored by the erstwhile Ordnance Factory Board's apex committee and an Army-led Technical Oversight Group, it repeatedly missed deadlines, indicating shortcomings in project monitoring and execution.
The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament has pulled up the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for a two-decade delay in procuring new artillery guns, saying the prolonged process left the Army dependent on obsolete weapon systems with limited firepower and adversely impacted its operational preparedness.
In its 49th Report of the 18th Lok Sabha (2026-27), the PAC said the delay in replacing the Army's ageing artillery fleet created a "huge deficiency" in capabilities and underscored the need for structural reforms in defence procurement, indigenous manufacturing and project execution.
The committee noted that the Army procured the 155mm/39 calibre Bofors guns in 1986 under a transfer of technology agreement. However, after the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) was banned in 1989, efforts to procure higher-calibre artillery guns through global tenders in the 1990s failed because of delays in finalising operational requirements and poor vendor response.
It took the Ministry two decades to finalise the procurement and induction of the new artillery gun system, resulting in a huge deficiency in stock, the report said, recommending that the ministry's institute a mechanism for periodic review of capability gaps and timely acquisition of critical military equipment in line with evolving security threats.
The PAC also criticised delays in the indigenous Dhanush artillery gun programme, saying inadequate infrastructure, evolving production methodology and shortages of specialised technical expertise significantly slowed the project.
The committee said it was "not convinced" by the ministry's explanation that the delays were inevitable because such a gun system had never been produced indigenously.
It recommended that future defence projects be preceded by comprehensive assessments of domestic manufacturing capabilities and infrastructure requirements to avoid time and cost overruns.
The report also flagged the lack of expertise in ballistics, gun electronics and the integration of advanced sighting systems, saying these deficiencies should have been identified during the project's planning stage rather than after execution had begun.
To bridge these gaps, the PAC recommended introducing specialised defence manufacturing courses in IITs and other technical institutions while establishing a regular upskilling mechanism for personnel in Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs).
The committee observed that although the Dhanush project was monitored by the erstwhile Ordnance Factory Board's apex committee and an Army-led Technical Oversight Group, it repeatedly missed deadlines, indicating shortcomings in project monitoring and execution.
The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament has pulled up the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for a two-decade delay in procuring new artillery guns, saying the prolonged process left the Army dependent on obsolete weapon systems with limited firepower and adversely impacted its operational preparedness.
In its 49th Report of the 18th Lok Sabha (2026-27), the PAC said the delay in replacing the Army's ageing artillery fleet created a "huge deficiency" in capabilities and underscored the need for structural reforms in defence procurement, indigenous manufacturing and project execution.
The committee noted that the Army procured the 155mm/39 calibre Bofors guns in 1986 under a transfer of technology agreement. However, after the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) was banned in 1989, efforts to procure higher-calibre artillery guns through global tenders in the 1990s failed because of delays in finalising operational requirements and poor vendor response.
It took the Ministry two decades to finalise the procurement and induction of the new artillery gun system, resulting in a huge deficiency in stock, the report said, recommending that the ministry's institute a mechanism for periodic review of capability gaps and timely acquisition of critical military equipment in line with evolving security threats.
The PAC also criticised delays in the indigenous Dhanush artillery gun programme, saying inadequate infrastructure, evolving production methodology and shortages of specialised technical expertise significantly slowed the project.
The committee said it was "not convinced" by the ministry's explanation that the delays were inevitable because such a gun system had never been produced indigenously.
It recommended that future defence projects be preceded by comprehensive assessments of domestic manufacturing capabilities and infrastructure requirements to avoid time and cost overruns.
The report also flagged the lack of expertise in ballistics, gun electronics and the integration of advanced sighting systems, saying these deficiencies should have been identified during the project's planning stage rather than after execution had begun.
To bridge these gaps, the PAC recommended introducing specialised defence manufacturing courses in IITs and other technical institutions while establishing a regular upskilling mechanism for personnel in Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs).
The committee observed that although the Dhanush project was monitored by the erstwhile Ordnance Factory Board's apex committee and an Army-led Technical Oversight Group, it repeatedly missed deadlines, indicating shortcomings in project monitoring and execution.
